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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Egyptian revolution is proving to be a very legal one.  That 
is not to say that the revolution’s demands have been legalized, or 
that Egypt’s law has been revolutionized.  Rather, the forces that 
have come to the fore since the toppling of Mubarak in February 
2011 have chosen law as the privileged form through which to 
bargain with each other.  The density of the legal back and forth 
has been overwhelming—constitutional amendments,1 
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1 In the aftermath of the revolution, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces 
(“SCAF”) suspended the 1971 constitution and appointed a special committee, the 
Constitutional Reform Committee, to draft constitutional amendments to allow 
for the transition to a new system of governance.  See Power or Glory: How 
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constitutional supplementary declarations,2 parliamentary laws, 
legislative amendments,3 military decrees,4 court trials,5 
                                                                                                                        
Successive Constitutional Changes Limit Egypt’s Presidency, EGYPT.COM (June 24, 
2012, 1:40 PM), http://news.egypt.com/english/permalink/126999.html.  A 
national referendum held in March 2011 approved the amended constitution by a 
majority vote of 77%.  See al-Natījah: Na’am bi-Nisbit 77.3% [Result: Yes by 77.3%], 
ISTIFTA’A. MIṢR [REFERENDUM. EGYPT], http://www.referendum.eg/84-
slideshow/155-result.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012) (Egypt).  For a complete list 
of the proposed constitutional amendments, see Nuṣūṣ al-Ta‘dīlāt [Constitutional 
Amendments], ISTIFTA’A. MIṢR [REFERENDUM. EGYPT], http://www.referendum.eg/ 
2011-03-13-00-09-44.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012) (Egypt).  Later on, SCAF 
changed course and rejected the amended constitution, as approved by the 
referendum, and unilaterally issued a provisional constitutional declaration to 
serve as an interim constitution until a new constitution is drafted.  For the full 
text of the provisional constitution, see al-I’alān al-Dusturī 2011 [Constitutional 
Declaration 2011], BIWĀBAT AL-ḤUKŪMAH AL-MIṢRĪYAH [EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT 
PORTAL], http://www.egypt.gov.eg/arabic/laws/constitution/default.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2012) (Egypt) (citing sixty-three articles, in comparison to the 1971 
Constitution’s 211 articles).  
2  On June 2012, SCAF issued a supplementary constitutional declaration 
amending provisions of the earlier constitutional declaration of March 2011.  The 
Constitutional Declaration (with June 17, 2012 Annex), CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INT’L PEACE (Oct. 17, 2012), http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/ 
2012/06/19/the-constitutional-declaration-with-june-17-2012-annex-added. 
3 The legislative drafting committee of the People’s Assembly approved a bill 
that amends the presidential elections law by adding a provision, which may be 
applied retroactively, that excludes members of the former ruling party from 
holding the positions of President, Vice President, Prime Minister, or Government 
Minister for ten years.  This is known as the “Political Isolation Law.”  Cf. Major 
Court Cases in Egypt’s Transition, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, 
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/02/major-court-cases-
in-egypt’s-transition (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) (noting that the Supreme 
Constitutional Court invalidated this law, permitting Ahmed Shafiq to remain a 
candidate).  On a different matter, the People’s Assembly approved the 
abolishment of Article 6 of the Law on the Military Judiciary, which allows the 
President to refer civilians for trial before military courts.  However, the Assembly 
approved a revision of Article 48 of the Law, which provides the military judicial 
authority and sole jurisdiction over certain types of crimes, regardless of whether 
they were committed by a civilian or a member of the military.  See Egypt: People’s 
Assembly Amends Law of 1996 on Military Judiciary, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403135_text (last 
updated May 8, 2012). 
4 Military decrees were issued to replace the amended constitution approved 
by a national referendum, to amend the law governing the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (“SCC”) regarding the appointment of its president, to 
dissolve the elected parliament, to amend the election law (to allow political 
parties to field candidates in the one-third of seats that had previously been 
reserved for independent candidates), and to eventually issue a new 
supplementary constitution (right after the presidential elections).  See Nathan J. 
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constitutional court decisions overturning laws passed,6 
presidential decrees,7 and emergency laws annulled and then 
reclaimed in another form.8  In fact, there was so much back and 
forth that to trace the historical unfolding of the Egyptian 
revolution, one would be wise to use the Official Gazette and law 
reports as a primary guide through this maze of events.  It is hard 
to miss the fact that in the case of Egypt, no sooner had the public 
                                                                                                                        
Brown, The Egyptian Political System in Disarray, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L 
PEACE, http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/19/the-egyptian-
political-system-in-disarray (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
5 For example, the Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court disbanded the 
National Democratic Party (Mubarak’s pre-revolution ruling party).  In another 
case, the Administrative Judicial Court issued a decision suspending the 
constitutional panel that included one hundred members (half of whom were 
parliamentarians representing Islamic interest groups) and assigned 
parliamentarians to select experts and individuals who do not belong to the 
legislative branch to join the panel.  Another tribunal, the Supreme Electoral 
Commission of Egypt, disqualified ten presidential candidates from the upcoming 
presidential race because they were in violation of the country’s election laws.  See 
Major Court Cases in Egypt’s Transition, supra note 3 (listing major post-revolution 
judicial decisions).  Finally, Egypt’s Criminal Court in Cairo ruled that the Muslim 
Brotherhood is legal, and that the 1954 decision to ban it is null and void.  See 
Sarah Paulsworth, Paper Chase: Cairo Court Voids 1954 Ban on Muslim Brotherhood, 
JURIST (July 4, 2012, 10:53 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/07/cairo-
court-voids-ban-on-muslim-brotherhood.php (finding that the Muslim 
Brotherhood had been in compliance with existing laws at the time of its origin). 
6 The SCC ruled in June 2012 that the political isolation law that bars old 
regime officials from running on the presidential ballot is unconstitutional.  Major 
Court Cases in Egypt’s Transition, supra note 3.  The Court further ruled that one-
third of the seats in the Lower House of the Egyptian Parliament were invalid, 
and ordered the dissolution of the entire parliament.  Case no. 20/2012/Supreme 
Constitutional Court (Egypt), available at http://www.earla.org/ 
userfiles/file/Case%20No_%2020%20of%20the%2034th%20Judicial%20Year.pdf.  
Commentators described these decisions as the “Judicial Coup.”   
7 Immediately after his election, Egypt’s President Morsi issued a presidential 
decree that invited the dissolved parliament to reconvene and to exercise its 
prerogatives (despite SCC and SCAF orders).  The July 8, 2012 presidential decree 
also called for the election of a new legislature within sixty days of the ratification 
of a new constitution.  See Ivana Assy et al., Presentation and Full English Text of 
Morsi’s Decree Restoring Parliament, AHRAMONLINE (July 9, 2012), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/47250/Egypt/Presentation-and-
full-English-text-of-Morsis-decre.aspx. 
8 SCAF lifted the Emergency Law on May 31, 2012.  However, prior to the 
presidential election, the army-backed government issued a decree giving the 
military the power to arrest civilians, in essence reviving the Emergency Law.  
The Supreme Administrative Court later annulled this governmental decree.  See 
Major Court Cases in Egypt’s Transition, supra note 3 (reporting on the declaration 
that the Military Police Law was unconstitutional).   
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space opened up for the political as an autonomous sphere—one 
that is only possible through genuine democratic practice—than it 
was annexed by the legal.  
2. LEGALIZING THE POLITICAL AND POLITICIZING THE LEGAL 
Ironically, just as the political forces expectantly turned to law 
and its institutions to mediate and arbitrate their raging battles, the 
Egyptian judiciary left its chambers and marched into the public 
sphere.  In doing so, it turned itself into a public interlocutor by 
holding press conferences, appearing on TV talk shows, and 
making statements to the foreign press, explaining and defending 
its decisions to the public.  Through these actions, the judiciary 
participated directly in the political debates that had dominated 
Egypt since the revolution,9 sometimes even openly favoring one 
side over the other.10  While the political forces legalized their 
bargaining maneuvers, the judiciary politicized its role, refusing to 
grant whatever “cover of law” the political forces sought to acquire 
from it.  In doing so, the judiciary seemingly denied itself the 
veneer of “objectivity and neutrality,” the public performance that 
sustains its high social status and privileges, choosing to blow the 
cover of the political forces and call their bluff, so to speak! 
The public watched the national judiciary closely, longing for a 
just and “revolutionary” resolution of the persistent political 
uncertainty and angst that had been hanging over the skies of 
Egypt since the revolution.  Although the public had idealistically 
hoped that the Court’s enforcement of the law would clear Egypt’s 
dark skies, it quickly surmised that this was the corrupt judiciary 
of Mubarak—dependent, abject, self-interested, and incompetent.  
Having failed to provide the “revolutionary” answer to the 
                                                     
9 The SCC released a statement to the media in response to the President’s 
July 8, 2012 decree to reinstate the parliament, proclaiming that its decisions “are 
final and not subject to appeal, and that its provisions in cases of constitutional 
interpretation and decisions are binding on all state authorities.”  See Egypt’s High 
Constitutional Court Tells President Calls [sic] Its Decisions ‘Final, Binding,’ 
AHRAMONLINE (July 9, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/ 
1/64/47248/Egypt/Politics-/In-response-to-presidential-decree,-Egypts-High-
Co.aspx.   
10 For an extreme example of this, see Justice Tahani el-Gebali’s statement to 
the New York Times regarding the judiciary’s role in keeping the military in power.  
David D. Kirkpatrick, Judge Helped Egypt’s Military to Cement Power, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/world/middleeast/judge-
helped-egypts-military-to-cement-power.html?pagewanted=all. 
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political “stuckness” of post-revolutionary Egypt, the judiciary 
quickly turned itself into the very cause for revolution. 
Things were a bit more complicated of course.  The judiciary’s 
performance had sufficient nuance; its overall failure to satisfy 
“revolutionary” desire in the law was interspersed with some 
successes which kept lawyers coming back to knock on the courts’ 
gates.  Sometimes, it seemed that litigants were driven not by any 
faith in the courts themselves, but rather by an ideal of the rule-of-
law state that they hoped would suddenly metamorphose before 
their eyes if they only kept up hope and kept coming back.11  
The legalization of political battles and the public scandal 
caused by the Egyptian judiciary’s failure to satiate the public’s 
need for the “revolutionary” answer seemed to turn every newly 
politicized Egyptian citizen into a lawyer.  If the rule-of-law was 
out there, but the judiciary refused to pick it up, then (“by Jove”) 
Ahmad and Adel were going to.  They were going to tell anyone 
who bothered to ask, in legalistic terms, how the court had failed to 
rule legally—how it failed to assert its own jurisdiction when it 
should have, how it claimed jurisdiction it should not have, how it 
upheld bad law about military trials, and how it overturned good 
law about parliamentary elections.  This type of widespread 
political discourse was an exciting development in Egyptian 
society and served as a slap in the face of social hierarchy and all 
its concomitant privileges.  There is something very exciting about 
this popularization of legal talk, which could be seen as an 
                                                     
11 For example, following its reinstatement by presidential decree (after its 
dissolution by SCC and SCAF), the elected Egyptian parliament decided to submit 
the question of its very legality, which was uncertain after the SCC ruling, to the 
Cassation Court.  The Court eventually decided that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the case.  See Alaa Shahine, Egypt Appeals Court Rejects Requests to Hear 
Parliament Case, BLOOMBERG (July 14, 2012, 8:34 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-14/egypt-appeals-court-rejects-
requests-to-hear-parliament-case-1-.html (noting that the ruling was unanimous); 
Egypt Presidency Declines to Comment on Court Ruling Against Restoration of 
Parliament, AHRAMONLINE (July 10, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/ 
NewsContent/1/64/47385/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-presidency-declines-to-
comment-on-court-ruli.aspx (reporting that President Morsi’s office capitulated to 
the Court of Cassation ruling).  See also Paulsworth, supra note 5 (discussing the 
Criminal Court’s decision to void the 1954 ban against the Muslim Brotherhood); 
Case no. 20/2012/Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt), available at 
http://www.earla.org/userfiles/file/Case%20No_%2020%20of%20the%2034th%
20Judicial%20Year.pdf (holding unconstitutional several provisions contained 
within Legislative Decree Nos. 120, 108, and 123, which were issued in 2011, 
amending the Parliament law, Law No. 38 of 1972). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
04_ABU ODEH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  4:32 PM 
346 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:2 
example of people “taking the law into their own hands”—the 
layman demystifying the rule of the “expert”, an in-your-face 
busting of social hierarchy and all its concomitant privileges.  Thus, 
in a very short period of time, one witnessed in the case of Egypt 
an interesting way of testing the limits of the rule-of-law state.  
This occurred not through critique—as happens in Western 
countries where the rule-of-law is thick—but rather through an 
overturning of hierarchy, where every citizen becomes the judge 
and legal language is popularized—its technical, mystifying 
quality flattened, made simple, and accessible, to be digested by 
the lay mind.   
3. WHAT WOULD A “PROPER JUDICIARY” HAVE DONE? 
Could the Egyptian judiciary have acted differently?  Could it 
have carried the day and arbitrated the conflicts between the 
political forces as objectively and neutrally as was expected of it?  
Could it have done so persuasively to the contending parties, 
allowing the judiciary to claim the mantle of autonomy from the 
executive and the legislature? 
Many decried the behavior of the Egyptian judiciary as 
symptomatic of a pliant judiciary—a residue of an ancien régime 
that refused to drop old habits, but instead, simply replaced 
Mubarak with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (“SCAF”).  
Had the judiciary behaved more autonomously, many thought, 
then the legal battles would have ended differently and favored 
the “revolution.”  
But this argument ignores that a judiciary capable of acting 
independently is one already buffeted by a robust political 
sphere—one in which political forces feel no compulsion to legalize 
their primary political battles in the first place.  In such a sphere, 
political forces bargain with each other politically, following 
background bargaining rules known to all, whether those rules are 
legal in the formal sense or merely customary.  In other words, an 
independent judiciary is only possible when it intervenes to settle 
disputes among political players only marginally, and only when 
there is confusion about the background bargaining rules or how 
to interpret the outcome of bargaining once it has taken place.  In 
these cases, the judiciary—no matter how high the stakes—can 
intervene to shift the interpretation of the background rules or 
change the political outcome by privileging one side over the other 
through its decision, while still appearing objective and neutral.  It 
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can do all that while not appearing as an actual participant in the 
political dispute.  Of course, the losing side may accuse the court of 
acting politically, as happened in Bush v. Gore.12  However, courts 
usually survive the day because of the marginality of such cases in 
the overall docket of the court.  Still, courts, especially 
constitutional courts like the Supreme Court of the United States, 
deal with many cases with significant political consequences.13  
Even so, American political arguments usually settle outside the 
court system, evidenced by their continuous coverage in the news.  
Politics happens as of course—its basic outline clear to all 
participants.  When this occurs, and courts are spared the burden 
of delineating the outline itself in a society that aspires to be 
democratic, then courts can get away with acting “independently.” 
In short, an independent judiciary can exist only where there is 
an active political sphere.  The quality of “independence” in a 
judiciary is not merely a function of the personal virtue its 
members would either enjoy or fail to enjoy.  It is also a function of 
the social organization of the state, just as corruption of state 
officials is a function of the economic and social organization of the 
state.   
4. UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP 
Of course, such conditions hardly prevailed under Mubarak, 
whose dictatorship absorbed the judiciary into its machinations of 
                                                     
12 On December 12, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court terminated recounts of 
election ballots in Florida, effectively awarding the presidential election to the 
Republican Party candidate, George W. Bush.  See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000).  The Court’s five most conservative Justices (all appointed by Republican 
presidents) constituted the majority on the 5-4 decision.  See Bush v. Gore, OYEZ, 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_949/#sort=ideology.  For 
a criticism of the decision, see, for example, ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME 
INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2002) (arguing that, 
because the conservative Justices voted according to political ideology or 
preferences, the decision “may be ranked as the single most corrupt decision in 
Supreme Court history.”). 
13 On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.), known as 
“Obamacare”), which represents the most significant federal law overhaul of the 
U.S. health care system.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012).  
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power.14  There have been periods and instances where the 
judiciary fought the dictatorship, including the High 
Administrative Court’s famous anti-Mubarak rulings and the 
period in the 1990s when the Supreme Constitutional Court took 
seriously the Egyptian constitution’s bill of rights, issuing several 
rulings that pushed for greater democratic representation.  Judicial 
decisions that overturn laws that cement repression, or decisions 
that declare illegal unfair state actions, abuses of authority, or 
corruption (and in the past twenty years there has been several of 
those), signal gestures of independence by the judiciary.15  But such 
acts of defiance, against a background of dictatorial rule 
interspersed with contrary acts of compliance by the same 
judiciary, signal less a thick judicial sphere acting legally than a 
political sphere in which the judiciary carefully calculates its 
position.  Because of the high stakes for the judiciary when it 
stands up to the repressive regime, its discrete acts of opposition 
signal a deliberate political act of its own.  And since underneath 
the thin veneer of legality, there is a thick and overbearing political 
consideration, one loses the sense that what is being undertaken is 
a legal interpretive activity, a judge reading the law objectively and 
neutrally, as the “Rule of Law ideology” would have him do.  In 
other words, one might describe those acts as “independent” but 
not exactly “judicial” even though they are the outcome of a 
judicial act and issued in the form of court decisions.  What is 
gained in acts of “independence” by the “judiciary” is lost in the 
performance of “a separate judicial sphere” because the element of 
calculation in the issued ruling is transparent when judged within 
the overall context of the behavior of the particular court over time.  
It is as if, in order to be deemed independent, the judge must cease 
being a judge altogether!  
A parallel perception develops in the collective mind of the 
judges’ national audience.  Contemptuous of the dictator’s law and 
longing for justice and vindication from an alternative authority, 
the public turns to the judiciary.  It pays little attention to the laws 
themselves or to the nature of judicial activity.  It shows scant 
                                                     
14 See generally Lama Abu Odeh, The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt: The 
Limits of Liberal Political Science and CLS Analysis of Law Elsewhere, 59 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 985 (2011) (chronicling the intermittently independent and influential Egyptian 
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interest in comprehending the machinations of interpretations or 
the judicial interpretive ethos that the judges see themselves 
obeying, even if only on the surface of their consciousness.  For the 
judges’ audience, “standing for” becomes synonymous with 
adjudicating, and “rightness and justice” becomes synonymous 
with law.  Thus, law loses its most basic quality—textuality—and 
judicial activity loses its most basic feature—interpretation.  It does 
not matter how interpretively persuasive the judge in a given 
instance might be.  As long as the decision does not correspond 
with the “rightness and justice” of the situation, the judge is not 
deemed to have acted independently.  Conversely, the audience 
might feel vindicated and rejoice with delight at the specter of an 
“independent” judge (the judge opposing the dictator), and the 
judge might savor the popularity.  But what has been lost in this 
latter moment of joint elation is the idea of the judiciary itself.  It is 
not just when the judiciary is compliant that it ceases to be a 
“judiciary” in the proper sense.  The same happens when exactly 
the opposite occurs—when it acts independently.  
5. AFTER THE REVOLUTION 
While SCAF has replaced Mubarak as the remaining 
“authoritarian” representative, the dictatorship no longer acts with 
the same robustness it had before the revolution.  New political 
forces have come to the fore as a result of the revolution, especially 
the Islamic forces, whose absence was notable during the time of 
the dictatorship.  The loosening up of the political sphere should, 
on principle, allow the judiciary room to maneuver, as it does not 
have to remain beholden to one dominant dictatorial force, and 
could therefore avoid being absorbed in the political machination 
of the time.  Such a possibility is at least open to an independently 
minded judiciary, which I will define here as: inclined to be 
politically opposed to the trappings of dictatorial rule, which could 
conceivably emerge from the bosom of the present judiciary.  After 
all, it is not uncommon to hear in Egypt: “There is no independent 
judiciary here, though there are independent judges.” 
6. DIFFERENT LOGICS 
But this “born-again” judiciary finds itself confronting 
paradoxical and contradictory demands, which it is hard to see 
how it could possibly manage, even if it were to call upon its most 
“independently” minded judges to meet those demands.  The 
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judiciary has to delineate the contours of the political sphere anew, 
while acting “independently” of it.  And at the same time, the 
judiciary has to maintain “interpretive fidelity” to the legal 
materials, as defined by the “Rule of Law ideology,” without 
which it cannot establish its “judicial-ness”, i.e., its autonomy as a 
sphere of the state.  On top of all that, the judiciary’s decisions 
must correspond to a revolutionary expectation of “rightness and 
justice” to make it all worthwhile in the end. 
Viewed more closely, two of those demands—“judicial-ness” 
(interpretive fidelity to the legal materials) and independence 
(from the political sphere)—belong to the Rule of Law ideology. 
The third demand—rulings that correspond with “rightness and 
justice”—belongs to the idea of “Revolution.”  This last demand 
assumes that the judges’ fidelity is to the ideas of “rightness and 
justice,” the principles that mobilized the people to Tahrir Square.  
Whatever legal materials are before them, judges should interpret 
those materials in light of those principles.  In other words, in order 
to comply with the principles of rightness and justice, the judiciary 
has to immerse itself in the “politics” of Revolution, foregoing 
interpretive fidelity to the legal materials for the benefit of fidelity 
to principles. 
Rule of Law and Revolution, therefore, belong to two different 
“logics” that are in tension with each other, even though, the one, 
Rule of Law, is often the historical genealogical descendant of the 
other, Revolution; and even though (and here’s the rub) the 
demand of the Egyptian revolution has been the Rule of Law state. 
7. THE LOGIC OF REVOLUTION 
Arguably, Revolution is the Rule of Law before “The Fall,” or 
“The Big Bang” if you like.  Revolution is the moment when all the 
spheres are condensed into one; where their implosion has yet to 
occur as independent spheres; where the text has yet to separate 
from “principle” and acquire its maddening interpretive quality; 
where the Rule of Law state has yet to be birthed.  At this collective 
moment, the screams on Tahrir—“Bread, Freedom, Social 
Justice”—yield their meaning without textuality intervening 
between the intention of the people and their words; the 
revolutionary “subject’ is there to inform us of what they mean, not 
in the sense that informing us is occurring orally, rather than in a  
written fashion (although that too!), but rather, that the enormity of 
the event in its earth-shattering transformation leaves no 
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ambiguity as to what is desired.  It is when all that is utopian is 
real. 
At that moment, “law” does not belong to the Rule of Law.  It 
is something altogether different: it is the simple working out in 
deductive fashion of the meaning of “Bread, Freedom, and Social 
Justice”!  It is when deduction is most transparent, determinate, 
and necessary—made stable by revolutionary desire that infuses 
the air.  The Revolution hovers as a meaning-stabilizer working as 
direct inspiration to “law.” 
Revolution not only removes the barrier of textuality from its 
project of self-projection unto the future, it also dismantles all those 
other past texts that bedeviled its subjects with its sadistic 
indeterminacy used by power to stabilize their oppression.  Law 
that is good combined with law that is bad, a civilian court with an 
emergency court, a democratically legislated law that is also a 
dictatorial one, text upon text in which legality, as indeterminate 
textuality, produced them determinedly and always as 
“criminals.”  
The Revolution, as the set of principles that end all texts, begins 
as a criminal act against the state, in which one’s criminality in the 
eyes of the state and its law is rudely and fearlessly returned back 
to the state with, “J’accuse!”  The accuser (the state) becomes the 
accused, and the accused (the Revolutionary) becomes the accuser.  
In this fashion, by staring the state in the eye when she had always 
been stared down by the state, the Revolutionary puts the state in 
its proper place.  We all remember that famous lunge on the bridge 
over the Nile, when the multitude lunged forward towards the riot 
police stacked up with their latest riot gear (supplied by the good 
offices of the United States), and, much to the multitude’s surprise 
and to the surprise of those who were watching, the police bolted 
back in fear.16  At that moment, the state with its towering 
authority crumbled, and the alienated powers of the collective 
projected unto the state were returned back to their original 
owners with a vengeance so sweet that history had to record.  
Indeed, after that bolt, the rest was history! 
                                                     
16 See freemanfilmsuk, 10’000 Egyptian Protestors Force Police to Retreat Over 
Bridge, YOUTUBE (JAN. 28. 2011), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=rXbRdumboZ0 (amateur video of the protest); Kareem Fahim, Egyptian 
Hopes Converged in Fight for Cairo Bridge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/world/middleeast/29cairo.html. 
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The Revolution is therefore doubly an “outlaw/law-that-is-out-
there”: it eliminates the legal texts of the state it puts in its proper 
place, and it reduces law into principle, eliminating the textuality 
that typically haunts the gap between law and principle in 
situations that are not revolutionary.  
8. THE LOGIC OF THE RULE OF LAW 
Law is politico-phobic within the Rule of Law.  Law’s 
utopianism lies in its insistence on a clean and clear separation 
from the political.  For the “subject” of the Rule of Law—the 
judiciary, Revolution smacks of the sphere of the political, where 
the messiness and ambiguity of power and resistance take place.  
The judiciary therefore cares not for Revolution as an event in new 
time, only what Revolution has managed to pass in legislative 
texts.  The universals of Revolution yield no definite answer the 
judiciary wishes to read.  Whatever principles Revolution may 
have enunciated that have turned into legal rules—that is the stuff 
of the Rule of Law. 
And even though legal rules are framed in the shape of 
“universals”—generalities addressing all, the equality of the rules 
is only formal.  Rules, whatever their content might be, apply 
equally to all with no exception.  The equality opened up by the 
universals of Revolution is, on the other hand, deep and cut 
through the formal flesh straight to the substance of the bone.  
Universals are an invitation to “Bread, Liberty and Social Justice” 
for all, no exception. 
And while Revolution challenges the authority of the state by 
putting the state in its proper place so that revolutionary subjects 
can take back whatever power they have projected unto it, the Rule 
of Law puts the power back in the state.  Unlike Revolution, Rule 
of Law is invested in exaggerating the power of the state because it 
speaks with the authority of the state outside of which it yields no 
meaning.  Indeed Rule of Law affirmatively uses the power of the 
state to sanction and punish. 
And unlike Revolution that presages clarity of meaning of 
what the subject of the Revolution wants, the Rule of Law relies on 
written legal texts, created through legislative compromise.  
Ambiguity, gaps, and conflicts are inherent to the text, and 
interpretation, with all its frustrating pursuit of the “intent of the 
legislature,” is what haunts the subject of the Rule of Law. 
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9. REVOLUTION-TRANSITION-RULE OF LAW 
If all went well with Revolution, the common wisdom says the 
transition from Revolution to Rule of Law would have been 
smooth, with the demands of Revolution embodied in new 
legislative texts and an honest independent judiciary.  So what is it 
that puts Egypt at this conjunction of Revolution and Rule of Law, 
stuck right in the teasing middle, its various contending parties 
using the Rule of Law to litigate Revolution, and using Revolution 
to put Rule of Law on trial?17  Is the trouble with the Egyptian 
“revolution” itself that it did not yield a smooth transition?  
Perhaps one shouldn’t call it a Revolution after all?18  Is the trouble 
with the very notion of transition—the assumption that Revolution 
yields a transition that is in effect an interruption in time and 
situation that eventually yields new legal texts and new judiciary?  
Or, is the trouble with the idea of the Rule of Law itself and the 
imagined respite it would deliver the Revolutionary once it is in 
full bloom?  
What is interesting, if not indeed ironic, is that the transitional 
situation in which Egypt finds itself is in some ways the envy of 
countries where the Rule of Law is thick and dominant.  To be able 
to judge the Rule of Law by the universals of Revolution, not so 
remote in memory and not made invisible by legislative texts, is an 
enviable position to be in.  To have law appropriated and mastered 
with confidence by the layman, whereby the role of judiciary is 
eliminated altogether, is the dream of progressives in such 
countries.  
One might push the critical point even further and argue that 
the idea that the Rule of Law will deliver a respite for the 
revolutionary and a resting place for the Revolution is itself a form 
of false consciousness.  No such place exists.  One might obtain an 
honest and independent judiciary, but legislation passed by an 
elected legislature and a counterrevolutionary situation prevails 
nevertheless.  Enemies of Revolution can as easily sneak right back 
                                                     
17 See supra notes 3 and 6. 
18 Other scholars share similar doubts on the making of the revolution.  See, 
e.g., Tamir Moustafa, It’s Not a Revolution Yet, Posted in The Middle East Channel, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 28, 2011, 5:24 PM), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/ 
posts/2011/02/28/it_s_not_a_revolution_yet (discussing the proposed 
amendments to the new Egyptian Constitution and Egypt’s precarious transition 
to democracy). 
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into control through proper law and an independent judiciary as 
they can through military uniforms and anti-riot gear.  And once 
they do, they are in fact much more tightly locked in, having 
acquired the legitimacy of the Rule of Law.  At the end of the day, 
aren’t visible displays of unjust power better than those that are 
invisible? 
“Revolution/Transition/Rule of Law” is an expression of a 
time sequence that has captured the imagination of Egyptian 
revolutionaries.  There is nothing unrealistic or irrational about it.  
Put in the simplest and most vulgar of terms, it is an expression of 
a perfectly legitimate desire to have a proper and functioning state.  
No sooner does Revolution size up the power of the authoritarian 
state, showing the limits of its projected authority and the 
hollowness of its inside through its acts of resistance and challenge, 
than it seeks to seize state power to prop it up again, this time on 
new terms, the terms of the Rule of Law.  The trouble is that this 
time sequence, rational and realistic, is also highly indeterminate.  
The indeterminacy plagues each one of its terms—Revolution, 
Transition, Rule of Law—as events that are disruptive of time and 
situation.  The indeterminacy of the first term, Revolution, 
implicates the other two terms, making the whole sequence 
indeterminate.  
10. INDETERMINATE REVOLUTION? 
As soon as we ask whether what happened in Egypt was a 
Revolution, we find our interpretation of the time sequence in the 
aftermath of the overthrow of Mubarak—or what I call here, 
“Transition”—indispensible to our answer.  And if that time 
sequence was pregnant with law and legalism(s), then our 
interpretation of law and legalism also seems to play a role in 
answering this question.  
A possible answer is that what happened in Egypt was not a 
Revolution, after all.  Yes, the spectacle of the crowds in Tahrir—
persistent, passionate, creative, and brave—was stunning and 
wondrous.  The moment when Mubarak, in the face of the crowds’ 
persistent chants, finally conceded his throne was indeed 
spectacular, but all of that did not amount to a Revolution.  What 
happened was simply a “tap” on an already imploding state.  The 
failure of the police to contain the gathering crowds was a signal of 
the weakness of the state, a decline already proceeding apace for 
several years before that crowning moment of spectacle.  The 
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crowds simply witnessed what those administering the state had 
known all along—that its collapse was a question of time only.  
Why is it that a “tap” on an imploding state does not amount to 
Revolution?  It is because it had no proper subject.  While a kind of 
media-generated consensus on calling it a Revolution quickly 
formed, there was no force that could step up briskly and 
forcefully after the fall of Mubarak to draw out the consequences of 
the chant “Bread, Liberty and Social Justice.”  No force could have, 
because, as we have seen with the benefit of time after the fall, no 
force did.  
There was indeed a group of people who called themselves 
“The Revolutionary Bloc” and the interpretation they offered of 
“Bread, Liberty and Social Justice”—which they often supported 
with their bodies in several altercations with the police in the 
aftermath of the overthrow of Mubarak—was most 
“revolutionary.”  But their spin proved solitary, utopian, 
overdrawn, and unwarranted by the events that followed; namely, 
state implosion followed by a dictator’s concession.  The subject 
necessary to tap an imploding state was very different from the 
one required to create a rupture in situation.  The former requires a 
condensation of rage, otherwise diffuse, that quickly finds its 
release in the achievement of the object at hand—the removal of 
the dictator.  The latter nurtures its resentment and rage in the 
service of a universal idea, the consequences of which bleed out 
over time.  It amounted to a revolutionary demand before the 
Revolution.  The crowds had already departed!19 
11. LAW IN THE SHADOW OF THE FALL 
If one adopts the pessimistic take on the above interpretation, 
one would have to eye with suspicion the law-filled time in the 
aftermath of the Fall (of Mubarak).  The legal density of the back 
and forth that I described in the opening paragraph of this essay 
can only trigger our suspicions.  That is to say, it is neither a 
species of the Rule of Law nor of Revolution.  It is not of the former 
                                                     
19 Most of my ideas about revolution as disruption in time and situation—an 
act that puts the state in its place and an event that elicits “universals” that require 
a revolutionary subject to tease out—I take from the French philosopher Alain 
Badiou.  Badiou’s philosophical writings are dedicated to analytically deciphering 
the meaning of revolution to which he attributes the capacity to yield “truths.”  
For an elaboration of his ideas on revolution, see ALAIN BADIOU, BEING AND EVENT 
(Oliver Feltham trans., Continuum ed. 2006) (1988). 
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because it cannot effectively project state authority without which 
the Rule of Law may not be performed persuasively.  The state has 
imploded and left the void in its tracks.  To the contrary, all those 
law-acts appear like a manic scramble for state authority—an 
abundance of law to make up for the absence of the state.  As if the 
aggregate of state (legal) acts, be it in the form of law or legal 
decisions, can bring an imploded state back to life! 
Arguably, the scramble for the state—the desire to put the 
fragments back together against the background of the Fall (rather 
than the Revolution)—can be attributed to both those who 
“tapped” the imploding state and those who lost their authority 
with the implosion.  For the latter, legalizing their power, even as a 
thin veneer similar to that under the dictatorship, was too hard to 
resist.  Indeed, it was business as usual.  For the former, the “sizing 
up” of the state may have been so terrifying that the dread of the 
void soon displaced the pleasure of overthrowing a dictator.  The 
desire for state authority quickly reinstated itself.  Those who lost 
their authority may be acting in a sinister fashion, claiming power 
back through law, while those who tapped the imploding state, 
look for good authority through law and litigation.  It is this 
conjoint desire for the state that fills the post-Fall period with 
dense law-acts.   
This kind of Rule of Law performance would take place outside 
the constraint of the universal: no Revolution had taken place, after 
all.  A dictator fell, revealing the weakness of the state he presided 
over.  This was no productive rupture that would set forth a new 
situation under the constraints of different norms.  Authoritarian 
law, punctured by certain legal concessions, can be reinstated with 
a view to accommodating the now diffuse rage of the 
demonstrators.  Military trials of demonstrators can continue while 
a reorganization of the police and the Ministry of Interior is 
conceded to the public to make it more transparent and less 
arbitrary.20  Meanwhile Mubarak’s trial takes place, albeit in 
                                                     
20 Approximately twelve thousand Egyptians were tried by military courts 
between Feb. 11, 2011 when SCAF assumed power and August 2011.  Countless 
others were also tried militarily before Morsi was elected in June 2012.  See Egypt: 
President Must Go Beyond Decree and Carry Out Greater Human Rights Reform, 
AMNESTY INT’L, (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-
president-2012-10-09 (explaining that about).  For a description of the military 
endeavor to revive the emergency rules, see supra note 8.   
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civilian courts and only for those crimes committed in Tahrir.21  
The dictator is  “under arrest,” but is spending his time in a 
military hospital for “health reasons.”  The usual practice of 
managing the state—splitting the difference and then splitting it 
again within the original split and so forth—is back.  This time, the 
difference is being split between two pressing considerations: on 
one side, the exigencies of cementing state power without radically 
reorganizing its practice; on the other, accommodating public 
discontent.  The absence of Revolution makes the resurfacing of 
this state managerial style less outrageous given its manic, 
overcompensating quality.  Repeating with intensity what had 
been the case before produces an air of urgency rather than 
normalcy.  A state had just imploded! 
12. LAW IN THE SHADOW OF REVOLUTION 
The above interpretation can be given a more nuanced and 
optimistic spin by insisting that, while all the above was true (i.e., 
that Tahrir was no more than a tap on an imploding state) and that 
the revolutionary bloc that emerged afterwards was guilty of an 
overbearing reading of the flash event of Tahrir; nevertheless, this 
reading could match the event through willful operation and 
diligent political work.  This would insist on projecting Revolution 
backwards and forwards: “It was a Revolution, therefore it is, 
therefore it will be!”  By tirelessly reminding Egyptians of the 
consequences of Tahrir when they had sized up the power of their 
state, by insisting that the distance between sizing up the state and 
seizing it was a very short one, and by convincing Egyptians that 
they can run, walk, or crawl that one last mile, but that they do so 
is a must—Revolution it will be!  
If one adopts this more optimistic spin of what happened in 
Tahrir, one would have to see the law-filled time in the aftermath 
of the Revolution as more complex, with the conflict of interests 
between those who lost and those who gained heightened, as each 
is now laboring under the constraint of the universal unleashed by 
Revolution.  For those who lost, law becomes a means through 
which the universal is blocked.  The tendency of the Rule of Law to 
siphon off any political influence outside its domain is most 
convenient for those purposes.  For those who lost, the 
                                                     
21 Egypt: Mubarak Verdict Fails to Deliver Full Justice, AMNESTY INT’L, (June 2, 
2012), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-mubarak-2012-06-02. 
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introduction of law—either good or bad law, early on in the 
process—is a means for derailing the normative pressure of the 
universal given the self-referential and extreme textuality of the 
law.  The faster one moves toward law and legal performances, the 
sooner one departs from revolutionary times.  The legal 
performance calls upon the state to respect the radical 
egalitarianism of the collective in Tahrir, while the law itself 
counters with its own textually constrained notion of 
egalitarianism, which will inevitably fall short. 
For those who won, the move to law is desired in a double, but 
ultimately contradictory, sense.  On the one hand, the Rule of Law 
with all that it implies is one of the enunciated goals of the 
Revolution.  As I mentioned earlier, the desire for the Rule of Law 
is part of the desire for a decent and functioning state that most 
Egyptians covet.  On the other hand, Rule of Law is seen as a 
means: to utilize the porous quality of the law at this early stage, to 
infuse law with the universal (to which it lives in temporal 
proximity), to insist that that law should echo as much as possible 
the commands of the universal, and to insist that law’s textuality 
should be interpreted under its constraint.  These are contradictory 
desires on the part of the revolutionary camp because, having the 
one, politico-phobic Rule of Law, they need to give up the latter, 
law constrained by the universal, and vice-versa.  
To have the Rule of Law in a state that labored for decades 
under dictatorships is itself so revolutionary that the attributes of 
Revolution are given to the Rule of Law mistakenly and in an 
idealizing fashion.  Beginnings as presaging birth of the new have 
their own political aesthetics, and collapsing differences through 
idealization might be one of them! 
Note how attributing the quality of Revolution to the removal 
of Mubarak and the implosion of the authoritarian state sharpen 
the degree of conflict between the forces of the old and the forces of 
the new and make law-acts that would otherwise appear to be run-
of-the-mill, difference-splitting, state management styles appear 
more assaultive and deliberate.  For they become more than a 
scramble for state authority; they are attempts at containing the 
revolutionary tide.  Given the inherently conservative nature of the 
Rule of Law as a sphere that blocks the political, the early entry 
into the Rule of Law domain soon after the events in Tahrir would 
seem to transport unresolved political conflicts into the more 
secure (for the old forces) domain of the law.  This is not because 
the judiciary is not independent and is still acting to please the old 
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political forces as the Revolutionary wisdom has it, but because the 
judiciary might choose to become independent from politics 
precisely by blocking off the influence of the Revolution as an 
event that constrains its interpretation of law.  By doing that, it 
would be most faithful to its judicial role and therefore most 
persuasive in its Rule of Law performances.  On the revolutionary 
side, on the other hand, this early immersion into law, while 
seemingly promising a Rule of Law-coveted universe, amounts to 
an invitation to law before the maturation of the universals of the 
Revolution.  The worst that could happen to a Revolution with 
weak subjects, whose Revolution teeters between self-inflicted 
implosion and revolutionary acts, is to be inducted into the Rule of 
Law before the revolutionaries have worked out the implications 
of their actions.  It is the entry into the “written” when they have 
barely had time to enunciate the words of Revolution. 
13. LAW IN THE SHADOW OF DEMOCRACY 
That what happened in Tahrir was indeed a revolution but a 
very specific one, namely, a popular Revolution for democracy, is 
by far the most popular interpretation of the events in Tahrir.  This 
interpretation, while insisting on the revolutionary nature of the 
Tahrir events, limits the range of the universals to be read out of 
them into one universal: namely, Democracy.  Indeed, what else 
could be read out of the toppling of a dictator but the desire for 
political freedom, the freedom to choose one’s representatives?  
Democracy, according to this interpretation, enters as a mediating 
term between Revolution and the Rule of Law.  The former is 
overridden by the choices democracy yields (the populace elects its 
political representatives); they come to stand in for whatever 
revolutionary potential there was.  The latter is treated as a species 
of democracy (elected representatives pass laws that are applied by 
an independent judiciary) and one of its organic effects. 
Democracy is inserted here with its own logic that is 
independent of that of Revolution and the Rule of Law.  A 
Revolution for Democracy is one that subordinates all its potential 
universals to the one of “choice.”  “Choice by the greatest number” 
is its most privileged term that functions as its sole universal.  The 
arrangements that put democracy in place are designed to mine the 
consequences of this one solitary universal: “choice.”  It is form to 
Revolution’s content; procedure to Revolution’s substance; 
nihilism to Revolution’s faith.  This is nothing to scoff at, as choice 
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is an expression of freedom, the practice of which is highly 
revolutionary in the aftermath of a dictatorship.  
Perhaps the most corrosive effect Democracy has on Revolution 
is that the democratic choice by the populace comes to seal the 
otherwise indeterminate events in Tahrir by offering its own 
retrospective interpretation of those events.  That its choice might 
fall on a party (the Muslim Brotherhood) that had hedged Tahrir, 
rather than participated un-ambivalently in it, one whose reaction 
to those events could best be described as “obscure” and at worst 
antagonistic, is even the more sobering for those insisting on flying 
a narrative-balloon above Tahrir with the word “REVOLUTION” 
inscribed on it.  More alarming still is the way the democratic 
choice suggests that what happened was more of a “tap” on an 
imploding state rather than Revolution—the tectonic plates moved 
and the next political force standing in line popped up, before they 
settled down again.  No universals were reported from the scene.   
While on the one hand, the Rule of Law is considered as an 
organic effect of the practice of Democracy, Democracy can have 
no less of a corrosive effect on the Rule of Law, seen as its twin, 
than it does on Revolution.  The legalization of dictatorial rule, or 
law as a means to practice authoritarian governance,22 was without 
doubt a burdensome legacy that Egyptians seem happy to be rid of 
with Mubarak’s departure.  But popular choice can turn and 
negate itself by choosing a supreme authority, such as God, to 
oversee the government’s worldly choices.  While the legislative 
machinery produced by Egypt’s first elections has not yet yielded 
enough legislation to judge how the Rule of Law under the reign of 
Democracy will fare, there are indications that unelected 
institutions such as Al-Azhar will be given supreme authority over 
Parliament to review compliance of democratically passed laws 
with Sharia law.23  This system offers no less of a Rule of Law 
                                                     
22 See Abu Odeh, supra note 14, at 992–95 (describing the role of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court of Egypt in Mubarak’s authoritarian regime). 
23 Article 4 of Egypt’s draft constitution enshrines the role of Al-Azhar as an 
“independent institution” and states that the opinions of the Senior Ulama Body 
will be taken in matters pertaining to Islamic law.  [Editor’s Note: Egypt’s State 
Information Service has not yet published on its website the new Constitution of 
Egypt, signed into law by President Morsi on December 26, 2012.  For alternative 
translations of the November 30 draft constitution that Morsi signed, see Nariman 
Youssef, Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated, EGYPT INDEPENDENT (Dec. 2, 2012, 
1:15 PM), http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1278681; The New 
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, http://www.constitutionnet.org/ 
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except that it is one whereby the worldly lawgiver has willingly 
delegated some of its powers to another for guidance.  
While the choice of democracy can have a double corrosive 
effect—one retrospectively on how to understand the events of 
Tahrir, and one prospectively on the Rule of Law—this is not 
altogether without limit.  A commitment to democracy and the 
Rule of Law in the aftermath of the toppling of a dictator would 
seem to drag with it a constellation of ideas, universally settled, 
about what they mean.  The uneasy relationship between 
democracy and “rights” is a staple of such constellations, inherited 
from Revolutions at other times in other places.  If the choice of 
democracy has the power to eliminate other universals from 
Tahrir, it nevertheless has to contend with universals imprinted in 
the institutions of democracy, “rights” being the most basic.  This 
would allow for a possible destabilization of democratic choice and 
its legislative embodiments, not from a source outside of the 
democratic government, but from deep inside of it through the 
settled legal trends of Revolutions elsewhere that have become 
legally “universalized.” 
“Rights” are open to interpretation and allow for possible 
constellations of liberties and entitlements that move from radical 
to liberal to conservative on the political spectrum, and can be the 
basis for another Revolution on different terms.  This time, 
Revolution comes from inside a settled discourse with its debates 
already drawn out in other contexts.  These debates can provide 
legitimate oppositional language that diffuse revolutionary forces 
can latch onto to compensate for their initial weakness.  The 
drafting of a new constitution after the fall of a dictator becomes a 
compensatory event that through the language of Rights utilized 
now with some urgency, allows for the universals of Tahrir to be 
revisited, recited, and rehashed through the particular public 
“choice” of democracy.  
14. CONCLUSION 
By the time I finished writing this paper, Morsi, the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s first democratically elected president of Egypt, had 
                                                                                                                        
files/final_constitution_30_nov_2012_-english-_-idea.pdf; The 2012 Constitution of 
Egypt, Translated by Nivien Saleh, with Index, http://niviensaleh.info/constitution-
egypt-2012-translation/.] 
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disbanded SCAF.24  SCAF had taken over the state in the aftermath 
of Mubarak’s fall and assumed the role of the caretaker of the 
transition to democracy.  SCAF’s rule was considered highly 
suspect given the heightened reliance on law to cement military 
control over the country.  SCAF was generally regarded as 
representing the network of interests that were prominent under 
Mubarak, now seeking to re-establish power on new terms.  The 
ease with which the dismantlement of SCAF took place and the 
almost complete absence of resistance on the part of SCAF is hard 
to interpret at this point.  Some argue that Morsi’s act is 
tantamount to finishing an unfinished revolution—a daring act 
that would not have been possible if it were not for the spirit of 
“Tahrir” and the multiple violent encounters with the army by the 
revolutionary forces.  It was the Revolution that inspired, 
produced, and directed its own final act.  Others opine that while 
the political representative of the interests has been removed, the 
network itself has not been eliminated.  They argue that the 
Muslim Brotherhood seeks to replace its own network in its stead, 
or alternatively, seek to edge its own network inside the old one to 
create a new partnership.  This analysis relies on the fact that the 
Brotherhood is adopting the same economic policies of the 
Mubarak regime (with minor differences) and is already showing 
signs of authoritarian control over political opposition.  The fact 
that such policies will aggravate the already difficult lives of the 
struggling masses and threaten to send them back to the streets 
again with a renewed round of repression from the state, means 
that little has changed in Egypt. 
Such arguments raise the specter that haunts Egypt and which 
I have tried to capture in this paper—namely, the 
indeterminateness of what happened in Egypt that led to the fall of 
Mubarak, which is a question that cannot be settled without an 
interpretation of the events that followed the Fall and the law-acts 
that permeated this time sequence.  One can either use the 
language of “revolution-over-time” or “revolution-counter-
                                                     
24 In August 2012 the president decided to revoke the supplementary 
declaration issued by SCAF and “retire” the heads of SCAF.  See Morsi’s Ramadan 
Surprise: Q&A with Nathan J. Brown, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Aug. 
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revolution-back-to-revolution” sequence or “popular revolution” 
to describe what happened and what continues to unfold.  What 
causes the indeterminateness is what the left has come to call “the 
weakness of the Revolutionary forces,” or what I call the ambiguity 
of the subject of Revolution.  It is my view that Egypt lives within 
the gravitational field of implosion, Revolution, and popular 
revolution for democracy, all at the same time, and that this 
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